Volume 66
Issue 6 V.66, Tolle Lege

Article 6

2-8-2022

An Easy Sell: The Third Circuit Protects Religious Advertising in
Colts v. Freethought
William Zachary Mineo

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, First Amendment Commons, Litigation
Commons, and the Religion Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William Z. Mineo, An Easy Sell: The Third Circuit Protects Religious Advertising in Colts v. Freethought, 66
Vill. L. Rev. 116 (2022).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss6/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Mineo: An Easy Sell: The Third Circuit Protects Religious Advertising in
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW ONLINE: TOLLE LEGE

66 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 53

AN EASY SELL: THE THIRD CIRCUIT PROTECTS RELIGIOUS
ADVERTISING IN COLTS V. FREETHOUGHT
WILLIAM ZACHARY MINEO
“Goebbels was in favor of freedom of speech for views he liked. . . . So was
Stalin. If you’re in favor of freedom of speech, that means you’re in favor of
freedom of speech precisely for views you despise, otherwise you’re not in favor of
freedom of speech.”1
I.

FORMING THE BIG IDEA: FREE SPEECH RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES

Americans generally esteem the “freedom of speech” that is secured in the First
Amendment.2 Nevertheless, one scholar has noted that societal attempts to silence
unpopular views can call into question whether a society upholds, and not just
esteems, the freedom of speech.3 This concern becomes even more pressing when
the government silences unpopular views to appease members of the public. 4
There are three types of forums where speakers enjoy differing degrees of
protection of free speech under the First Amendment.5 First, public forums are
government property where the public has customarily had the opportunity to
express ideas freely, such as in a public park. 6 The Constitution generally bars the
government from restricting free speech in public forums.7 Second, designated
public forums are government property where the public has not customarily
expressed ideas but where the government has designated the property for free

1. Peter Wintonick, Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media: The
Companion Book to the Award-winning Film by Peter Wintonick and Mark Achbar 184 (Mark
Achbar ed., 1994).
2. See generally Robert A. Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States Versus the Rest
of the World, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 377, 378–79 (2006) (describing Americans’ views on the First
Amendment). The First Amendment applies to all “government entities.” See Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
3. See Wintonick, supra note 1, at 184 (asserting that free speech requires tolerance for
opposing views).
4. See Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. COLTS, 938 F.3d 424, 428–30 (3d Cir. 2019) (describing
a government-imposed restriction on speech out of concern for potential negative public
reactions).
5. See Verlo v. Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113, 1129 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)) (describing the “public forum,”
“designated public forum,” and “nonpublic forum” frameworks).
6. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (quoting
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)) (noting that the right to free speech is
greatest in public forums).
7. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 n.11 (2010) (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460,
469 (2009)) (detailing the constitutional limits on government regulation of speech in public
forums).
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speech, such as in a university’s free speech area. 8 The Constitution also generally
bars restrictions on speech in designated public forums. 9 Third, nonpublic forums
are government property where the public has not customarily expressed ideas and
where the government has not designated the property for free speech, such as in a
courthouse.10 In nonpublic forums, the government may prohibit speech on one or
more topics “as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”11
When the government prohibits speech about a topic in a forum, the restriction
is called a “subject matter prohibition.” 12 For example, if a city government
publishes its own newspaper, it could enact a subject matter prohibition on articles
about politics in each edition.13 The subjects that the city allows articles to be written
about—perhaps the city school system, local businesses, or public health
concerns—are called “permissible subjects.”14 Under the First Amendment, the city
would not be allowed to prohibit any particular speaker from writing an article on a
permissible subject based on the speaker’s point of view.15 Doing so would
discriminate against the speaker in what is called “viewpoint discrimination.”16 In
building off the previous example, if the city decided to begin accepting opinion
pieces about politics but refused to run opinion pieces submitted by labor unions,
the government would be committing unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 17
In applying this case law, the Third Circuit recently ruled that the County of
Lackawanna Transit System’s (“COLTS”) refusal to run an advertisement for a local
religious organization was unconstitutional in Northeastern Pennsylvania Freethought

8. See id. (quoting Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 469–70) (describing how the government
establishes designated public forums); see also Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1234 (11th Cir.
2011) (concluding that a public university’s free speech area was a designated public forum).
9. See Martinez, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11 (quoting Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 469–70)
(detailing the constitutional limits on government regulation of speech in designated public
forums).
10. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (describing nonpublic forums); see also Huminski v. Corsones,
396 F.3d 53, 90 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a courthouse was a nonpublic forum).
11. Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46) (detailing the constitutional limits on government regulation
of speech in nonpublic forums); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (noting that the government has the right to “preserve . . . [its] forum[s]”)
(alteration in original).
12. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
(citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 49) (discussing the constitutionality of subject matter prohibitions); Ne.
Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. COLTS, 938 F.3d 424, 442 (3d Cir. 2019) (Cowen, J., dissenting) (referring
to a government prohibition on religion as a “subject-matter prohibition”); R. George Wright,
Managing the Distinction Between Government Speech and Private Party Speech, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 347,
365 (2016) (exploring how a “subject matter prohibition” can affect expressing viewpoints).
13. For a discussion of subject matter prohibitions, see infra Section II.B.
14. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001) (noting that
viewpoints can be expressed on permissible subjects in a forum).
15. See id. at 106–07 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829) (noting that the government cannot
discriminate against anyone’s point of view when restricting speech).
16. See id. at 107 (describing government viewpoint discrimination). The Supreme Court
has also referred to policies that “constitute[] unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination” as being
“viewpoint discriminatory.” See id. at 107, 110.
17. For a discussion of viewpoint discrimination, see infra Section II.A.
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Society v. COLTS. 18 The religious organization’s advertisement contained the header
“Atheists” and a web address to the organization’s website.19 Because several outof-state businesses encountered boycotts and violence after running religious
advertisements, COLTS refused the religious organization’s request to display the
advertisement.20 The Third Circuit held that the refusal constituted viewpoint
discrimination because COLTS allowed secular organizations to advertise about
their presence in the area while refusing the same opportunity to religious
organizations. 21 In addition, the Third Circuit held that the government cannot
prohibit speech on religion, reasoning that all subject matter prohibitions on religion
are unconstitutional based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Good News Club v. Milford
Central School.22 The Third Circuit concluded by holding that even if COLTS’s policy
did not constitute viewpoint discrimination, the policy was an unreasonable
restriction in a nonpublic forum because COLTS ran religious advertisements in the
past without encountering any negative public reactions. 23
This Note argues that the Third Circuit correctly held that COLTS’s policy
constituted viewpoint discrimination and was unreasonable. 24 In addition, this Note
argues that the Supreme Court has not held that subject matter prohibitions on
religion are per se unconstitutional, unlike the Third Circuit, which found that the
Supreme Court ruled all subject matter prohibitions on religion unconstitutional in
Good News Club.25 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit’s ultimate ruling in favor of the
religious organization was correct because the policy’s viewpoint discrimination
alone made the policy unconstitutional. 26 Moreover, public policy considerations
further support the validity of the Third Circuit’s ruling. 27
Part II of this Note explores the Supreme Court cases that set the stage for the
Third Circuit’s analysis in Freethought. Part III recounts the history of COLTS’s
advertising policy and the facts that led to this case. Part IV discusses the Third
Circuit’s three holdings, while Part V argues for one alternative holding and expands
18. See 938 F.3d 424, 428–31, 442 (3d Cir. 2019) (finding the government’s policy violated
the First Amendment).
19. See id. at 429 (describing the religious organization’s advertisement).
20. See id. at 429–30 (noting the reasoning behind COLTS’s rejection of religious
advertisements).
21. See id. at 434–35 (finding viewpoint discrimination because COLTS restricted the speech
of religious organizations on a permissible subject).
22. See id. at 433 (asserting that the Supreme Court already ruled that subject matter
prohibitions on religion are per se unconstitutional).
23. See id. at 429, 439 (detailing the lack of complaints from religious advertisements that
COLTS ran). The court refrained from determining what forum COLTS’s buses were because
COLTS’s policy was unconstitutional under the nonpublic forum framework, the least demanding
of the forum analyses. See id. at 437 n.2.
24. For a complete argument on the Third Circuit’s holding on COLTS’s viewpoint
discrimination and unreasonableness, see infra Sections V.A.1 and V.A.3.
25. See Freethought, 938 F.3d at 443 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (arguing that Supreme Court has
not ruled all subject matter prohibitions on religion unconstitutional). For a complete argument
on the Third Circuit’s holding on the constitutionality of a subject matter prohibition on religion,
see infra Section V.A.2.
26. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001) (noting that all
viewpoint discriminatory government policies are unconstitutional).
27. For a discussion of the public policy considerations of the Third Circuit’s ruling, see
infra Section V.B.
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on the reasoning for the remaining two holdings. Lastly, Part VI details the practical
and legal consequences of the Third Circuit’s ruling in Freethought.
II.

PERFORMING MARKET RESEARCH: FIRST AMENDMENT CASE LAW

The Third Circuit based its holdings off a number of cases that are instrumental
to understanding the First Amendment.28 This case law includes three Supreme
Court cases about religious viewpoint discrimination and several Supreme Court
cases about subject matter prohibitions in nonpublic forums.29
A. Case Law Concerning Religious Viewpoint Discrimination
The Supreme Court first invalidated a policy discriminating against religious
viewpoints in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District.30 In this case,
a New York public school allowed organizations holding public meetings on
subjects relating to the community’s well-being to use school space after school
hours.31 However, the board refused one religious organization the opportunity to
teach about parenting because the organization planned to show films that
recommended making use of religion to raise children. 32
The Court recognized that the First Amendment prohibits the government
from silencing viewpoints on permissible subjects and that parenting was a
permissible subject under the board’s policy.33 Consequently, the Court held that
the board’s policy discriminated against religious viewpoints because only
nonreligious speech could be offered on parenting, a permissible subject in the
forum.34 Moreover, the Court held that it made no difference that all religions were
equally prohibited from using school space because the policy still gave favor to
nonreligious viewpoints over religious viewpoints. 35
Two years later, the Supreme Court invalidated a second discriminatory policy
in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia.36 The University of Virginia
provided funding to student journalism organizations that covered topics applicable
to the student body, but the university denied funding for student organizations that
were engaged in “religious activities.”37 In particular, the university refused to fund

28. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s ruling, see infra Section IV.A.
29. For a discussion of the three Supreme Court cases about religious viewpoint
discrimination, see infra Section II.A. For a discussion of the Supreme Court cases about subject
matter prohibitions in nonpublic forums, see infra Section II.B.
30. 508 U.S. 384, 386–87, 393–94 (1993) (finding the policy to be viewpoint discriminatory).
31. See id. at 387 (describing the school board’s policy).
32. See id. at 387–89 (recognizing that the religious organization planned to show religious
films at its meetings).
33. See id. at 393–94 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985)) (detailing the unconstitutionality of viewpoint discrimination).
34. See id. (finding the school board’s policy was unconstitutionally viewpoint
discriminatory).
35. See id. at 393 (rejecting the appellate court’s position that the policy was “viewpoint
neutral”).
36. 515 U.S. 819, 824–26, 831 (1995) (holding that the policy constituted religious viewpoint
discrimination).
37. See id. at 824–26, 842 (detailing the public university’s policy).
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the printing costs of one organization’s religious newspaper that covered a variety
of topics, including philosophy, music, anxiety, and societal issues.38 The Court
recognized that the student organization covered topics that were permissible
subjects under the university’s policy.39 In holding the policy unconstitutional, the
Court noted that “the University does not exclude religion as a subject matter [for the journal
to publish articles about] but selects for disfavored treatment those student
journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.”40
At the turn of the millennium, the Supreme Court expressed its distaste for
religious viewpoint discrimination for a third time in Good News Club.41 A public
school board permitted organizations to use its school space for instruction on youth
development, but the board refused a religious youth organization the opportunity
to use its space for this purpose.42 The board believed that the organization’s desire
to read the Bible, sing, and pray constituted a religious service.43
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that the religious organization’s
methodology for teaching youth development was “quintessentially religious.”44
The Court observed that this methodology could also express a viewpoint on youth
development and achieve the developmental goals that the policy allowed.45 The
Court further reasoned that it made no difference if the methodology constituted a
religious service or even communicated a religious message because the
methodology still expressed a viewpoint on youth development. 46 Consequently, the
Court found that the policy discriminated against religious viewpoints and was
unconstitutional.47
B. Case Law Concerning Subject Matter Prohibitions in Nonpublic Forums
A series of Supreme Court cases established the case law on subject matter
prohibitions in nonpublic forums, beginning with Cohen v. California.48 In Cohen, the
Court held that it was unconstitutional for the government to silence a person’s
38. See id. at 826–27 (describing the religious newspaper and the university’s refusal to pay
for the newspaper’s printing costs).
39. See id. at 831 (observing that the university’s policy provided reimbursement for
journalism on subjects that the student organization’s newspaper covered).
40. Id. (emphasis added) (holding that the university’s policy constituted viewpoint
discrimination).
41. 533 U.S. 98, 102–03, 120 (2001) (holding the government’s discriminatory policy
unconstitutional).
42. See id. at 102–03, 108 (analyzing the school board’s application of its policy).
43. See id. at 103 (discussing the reasoning behind the school board’s denial of the religious
organization’s request to use school space).
44. See id. at 111 (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 510 (2d
Cir. 2000)) (stating the appellate holding).
45. See id. (quoting Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 512 (Jacobs, J., dissenting)) (noting that
religious viewpoints can speak to secular subject matters).
46. See id. at 112 n.4 (“[T]he [religious organization’s] activities do not constitute mere
religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values. . . . And we see no reason to treat
the [organization’s] use of religion as something other than a viewpoint merely because of any
evangelical message it conveys.”).
47. See id. at 112 (striking down the policy).
48. See 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for wearing a
jacket sporting an inflammatory message while inside of a courthouse was unconstitutional).
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speech based on an unsubstantiated “fear or apprehension of disturbance” that the
speech could cause in the forum.49 Several years later in Perry Education Association v.
Perry Local Educators’ Association,50 the Court held that a town could constitutionally
prohibit a competing teachers’ union from using the town’s interschool mail system
where the mail system was meant for the teachers’ official union and a history of
hostility existed between the two unions.51
The Court upheld a similar restriction in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc.,52 where a federal commission solicited funds from federal
employees for various charities, but the commission refused to solicit donations for
lobbyist organizations.53 The Court stated that while a government restriction on
speech must be reasonable, the restriction “need not be the most reasonable or the
only reasonable limitation.”54 In view of this standard, the Court concluded that the
restriction on speech was reasonable because revenues decreased and employees
complained when the commission allowed the lobbyist organizations to participate
in a prior year drive.55 In addition, the Court recognized that the commission’s
exclusion of these organizations would prevent disturbances among employees, and
“the Government need not wait until havoc is wreaked to restrict access to a
nonpublic forum.”56
Notably, the Supreme Court ruled against a religious organization in International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,57 where several public airports prohibited
people from asking for money or handing out written materials in their terminals. 58
The members of a religious organization desired to undertake these activities, but
the Court ruled that this restriction on speech was reasonable because the restriction
prevented the forum’s slow flow of traveler movement from becoming even
slower.59 For similar reasoning, the Court upheld a restriction on political speech in
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,60 where a public broadcasting
organization prohibited a lesser known candidate from participating in a televised
debate because accommodating anyone interested in public access would inhibit the

49. Id. at 22–23 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969)) (noting the government’s unfounded concern over the defendant’s inflammatory message).
50. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
51. See id. at 39–40, 50–53 (observing that the competing union lost a referendum it initiated
to supplant the official union, that the speech restriction would assist the official union in its duties,
and that the restriction would “insur[e] labor-peace within the schools”).
52. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
53. See id. at 790–93 (upholding the policy prohibiting lobbyists from soliciting funds from
federal employees).
54. Id. at 808 (explaining the constitutionality of speech prohibitions in nonpublic forums).
55. See id. at 810 (observing the employee complaints and the decrease in donors when
lobbyist organizations were allowed to participate).
56. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 52 n.12 (1983))
(holding that the government can be proactive in restricting speech).
57. See 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
58. See id. at 675–76, 685 (quoting Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 925
F.2d 576, 578–79 (2d Cir. 1991)) (detailing and upholding the airports’ restriction on speech).
59. See id. at 685 (quoting Krishna Consciousness, 925 F.2d at 582) (noting that the forum’s slow
flow of travelers was a significant issue for the forum).
60. See 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
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forum from functioning effectively.61 Conversely, the Supreme Court struck down
a restriction on political speech in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky,62 where
Minnesota prohibited its residents from wearing apparel containing political
messages when voting.63 In striking down the law, the Court reasoned that the
statute did not adequately define what would constitute a political message,
potentially causing the enforcers of the statute to administer the law unevenly based
on their personal knowledge and beliefs.64
III.

PREPPING THE VISION BOARD: HISTORY BETWEEN COLTS AND
FREETHOUGHT

COLTS is a public busing company that runs buses in Lackawanna County,
Pennsylvania.65 Federal, state, and county governmental authorities provide COLTS
with most of its funding because COLTS’s revenue from bus fares “is negligible.” 66
COLTS also earns less than two percent of its revenue from the advertisements it
runs on the interior and exterior of its buses.67 In 2011, COLTS implemented a
policy to reject provocative advertisements that could lead to the “threats, boycotts,
and vandalism” that five out-of-state businesses encountered after running divisive
advertisements.68 In 2012, the Northeastern Pennsylvania Freethought Society
(“Freethought”), a religious organization, asked COLTS to run an advertisement
that contained the header “Atheists” and a web address to Freethought’s website. 69
Freethought hoped the advertisement would notify atheists of Freethought’s
presence in the area and also help non-atheists learn about the organization. 70
COLTS denied the advertisement under its 2011 policy, believing that Freethought
intended the advertisement to “spark a debate on [the] buses.” 71 Freethought
submitted a second request to run a substantially similar advertisement, but COLTS
again denied the request under its 2011 policy stating that the advertisement
promulgated religious beliefs that could bother its riders. 72
Following Freethought’s second request, COLTS revised its policy in 2013 to
stipulate that it would reject all advertisements that are “religious in nature” or that
“promote the existence or non-existence of a supreme deity” to maintain peace on

61. See id. at 669–73, 682–83 (describing and upholding the restriction on speech).
62. 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018).
63. See id. at 1882, 1892 (describing Minnesota’s statute concerning voting at polling places).
64. See id. at 1888, 1890–91 (holding the ambiguous statute unconstitutional).
65. See Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. COLTS, 938 F.3d 424, 428 (3d Cir. 2019) (detailing
COLTS’s functions).
66. Id. at 428 (noting that government authorities provide COLTS with most of its funding).
67. Id. (detailing COLTS’s advertising revenue).
68. Id. at 429, 439 (recounting the history of COLTS’s advertising policy and noting that
these businesses were not located in Pennsylvania).
69. See id. at 429 (“The proposed ad simply read ‘Atheists,’ and included Freethought’s web
address, superimposed on a blue sky with clouds.”).
70. See id. (recognizing that Freethought desired to alert locals to Freethought’s vicinity).
71. Id. (observing that COLTS was suspicious of Freethought’s motives).
72. See id. (noting that COLTS denied Freethought’s second advertisement because it could
disturb riders and reduce ridership revenue).
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its buses.73 Importantly, Freethought’s atheistic beliefs qualify as religious under the
First Amendment and hence under COLTS’s policy.74 COLTS stated that it enacted
the 2013 policy to help preserve or even increase its number of riders while also
earning revenue.75 In turn, COLTS denied Freethought’s third request to have the
“Atheists” advertisement run under the 2013 policy, reasoning that “the ‘existence
or non-existence of a supreme deity is a public issue’” and that the advertisement
could threaten the peaceful environment inside the buses.76
COLTS eventually agreed to run Freethought’s fourth request that replaced
“Atheists” with “Freethought.”77 Despite this substitution, Freethought still desired
to include “Atheists” as the header in its advertisement and sued COLTS to obtain
an injunction to allow the advertisement to run as originally designed.78 The United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held for COLTS by
denying the injunction, and Freethought subsequently appealed the decision to the
Third Circuit.79
IV.

MAKING THE PITCH: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S HOLDINGS

The Third Circuit judges split into majority and dissenting opinions in issuing
the ruling.80 The majority believed that COLTS’s policy discriminated against
religious viewpoints while the dissent argued that the policy was instead a reasonable
subject matter prohibition on religion that did not discriminate against religious
viewpoints.81
A. The Majority Opinion
The Third Circuit began its viewpoint discrimination analysis by recognizing
that secular organizations could advertise through COLTS to notify the public of
their presence in the area, but COLTS refused the same opportunities to religious
organizations because of the religious nature of their advertisements.82 The court
further reasoned that any connection between Freethought’s original advertisement
and religion was incidental to the subject matter of Freethought’s speech:
“organizational existence, identity, and outreach.”83 Because COLTS only permitted

73. Id. at 430 (detailing the 2013 policy).
74. See Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2005) (concluding atheism is a
religion under the First Amendment).
75. See Freethought, 938 F.3d at 430 (exploring COLTS’s purpose behind its policy).
76. Id. (detailing COLTS’s denial of Freethought’s third advertisement).
77. See id. (recognizing that COLTS accepted a secularized version of Freethought’s
advertisement).
78. See id. (discussing Freethought’s legal action).
79. See id. at 431 (quoting Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. COLTS, 327 F. Supp. 3d 767, 779–
80 (M.D. Pa. 2018)) (detailing the district court’s holding on COLTS’s policy and the subsequent
appeal).
80. See id. at 453 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at 435 (majority opinion) (holding that COLTS’s policy was unconstitutional); id.
at 447, 450, 453 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (arguing that COLTS’s policy was constitutional).
82. See id. at 434 (majority opinion) (analyzing COLTS’s administration of its policy).
83. Id. at 435 (“It’s true that Freethought’s ‘Atheists’ ad relates to the ‘subject’ of religion
writ large. But at its core, its message is one of organizational existence, identity, and outreach.”).
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secular organizations to speak about organizational existence, the court held that
COLTS’s 2013 policy constituted viewpoint discrimination. 84
The Third Circuit also explored the constitutionality of a prohibition on religion
as a subject matter, recounting how the Supreme Court in Rosenberger recognized that
the university did not “exclude religion as a subject matter.”85 The court noted that
this language might be read to imply that a subject matter prohibition on religion
can be constitutional if there is no accompanying viewpoint discrimination. 86
However, the court asserted that the Supreme Court disavowed the possibility of a
constitutional subject matter prohibition on religion in Good News Club where the
Court held that the government could not prohibit the “‘quintessentially religious’
activities” at issue.87
Although the Third Circuit held that COLTS’s policy constituted viewpoint
discrimination, the court proceeded to analyze the reasonableness of the policy if in
fact the policy did not discriminate against viewpoints. 88 The court began by noting
that COLTS’s policy does not accord with the First Amendment’s aim of protecting
unpopular viewpoints.89 To the contrary, the court recognized that COLTS’s policy
incentivizes people to react disruptively to opposing viewpoints so that the
government will silence the speech they find disagreeable as part of the
government’s efforts to preserve the forum.90
The court also observed that COLTS ran religious advertisements in the past
without any negative public reaction. 91 In fact, the court noted that the only
complaint COLTS received relating to its advertising stemmed from its denial of
Freethought’s advertisements.92 When analyzing how the policy is administered, the
court noted that COLTS employees draw on personal knowledge when determining
what advertisements violate the policy, much like the enforcers of the political
apparel policy in Minnesota Voters Alliance.93 The court expressed concern that these
employees could disproportionately apply the policy to major religions because

84. See id. (holding COLTS’s policy unconstitutional because the policy banned religious
speech on a permissible subject).
85. Id. at 433 (detailing the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Rosenberger).
86. See id. (recognizing that Rosenberger may have implied the possibility of a constitutional
subject matter prohibition on religion).
87. See id. (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 103, 111 (2001))
(reasoning that Good News Club clarified the Court’s holding in Rosenberger).
88. See id. at 437–38 (beginning the analysis to determine whether COLTS’s policy was
reasonable).
89. See id. at 438 (first quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S.
217, 235 (2000); then quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991); and then quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)) (discussing the purpose of the First Amendment).
90. See id. (citing Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty., 781 F.3d 489, 504 (9th
Cir. 2015) (Christen, J., dissenting)) (reasoning that people may be inclined to cause disturbances if
it causes the government to silence disagreeable speech to maintain peace in the forum).
91. See id. at 429, 439 (“COLTS had routinely run religious ads in the past with no
problem.”).
92. See id. at 439 (observing the court record was bereft of complaints regarding COLTS’s
advertisements).
93. See id. at 440 (quoting Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1890 (2018))
(identifying the ambiguity in COLTS’s policy).
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major religions are more recognizable than lesser-known religions.94 In finding the
policy unreasonable, the court held for Freethought and ordered the district court
to issue an injunction against COLTS. 95
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Despite the majority’s in-depth analysis, the dissent opposed the majority on all
three of its holdings.96 First, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s interpretation
of Good News Club, arguing that the Supreme Court did not take away the
government’s right to prohibit religion as a subject matter. 97 Rather, the dissent
asserted that Good News Club holds that quintessentially religious activities can also
communicate a viewpoint.98 Additionally, the dissent recognized that Good News
Club made no determination on the constitutionality of a prohibition on religious
activities that do not “primarily” speak to a permissible subject. 99 Next, the dissent
argued that COLTS constitutionally prohibited speech concerning “religion—the
existence or non-existence of a deity.”100 The dissent concluded by arguing that
COLTS’s policy was reasonable because it would help to prevent the same problems
encountered by other businesses that ran religious advertisements.101
V.

GETTING CONSTRUCTIVE FEEDBACK: ANALYSIS OF THE THIRD
CIRCUIT’S HOLDINGS

The Third Circuit correctly held that COLTS’s policy constituted viewpoint
discrimination because the policy allowed secular organizations to advertise about
their presence while depriving religious organizations of this same opportunity. 102
Additionally, the Third Circuit correctly found that COLTS’s policy was
unreasonable because of the low likelihood that COLTS would experience the
boycotts or violence that the five out-of-state businesses encountered.103 Although
the Third Circuit’s holding on the unconstitutionality of subject matter prohibitions
on religion was not critical to its ruling, the Supreme Court’s holding in Good News
Club was actually only limited to holding that subject matter prohibitions on religious

94. See id. at 441 (reasoning that COLTS’s policy may disadvantage major religions).
95. See id. at 442 (concluding in Freethought’s favor).
96. See id. at 443, 450, 453 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (arguing for alternative holdings).
97. See id. at 443 (arguing that Good News Club preserved the government’s right to prohibit
religion as a subject matter).
98. See id. (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111 (2001))
(reasoning that the Supreme Court’s holding in Good News Club was limited).
99. See id. (quoting Archdiocese of Wash. v. WMATA, 897 F.3d 314, 329 (D.C. Cir. 2018),
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1198 (2020)) (describing a question left open following Good News Club).
100. See id. at 450 (distinguishing COLTS’s policy from viewpoint discrimination because
COLTS prevented Freethought from speaking about a prohibited subject).
101. See id. at 453 (reasoning that COLTS’s policy would help preserve the forum).
102. See id. at 434 (majority opinion) (identifying viewpoint discrimination in COLTS’s
policy).
103. See id. at 429, 439 (observing that COLTS received no complaints about the religious
advertisements it ran before implementing its 2013 policy)
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activities that also express a viewpoint on permissible subjects are unconstitutional. 104
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit’s ruling in favor of Freethought was valid because
all viewpoint discriminatory government policies are unconstitutional. 105 Additional
public policy considerations further demonstrate the soundness—and importance—
of the Third Circuit’s ruling.106
A. The Third Circuit’s Holdings
The Third Circuit could have strengthened its opinion in three ways. First, the
court could have recognized that under Good News Club, the government cannot
silence speech that speaks to both a permissible subject and religion. 107 Second,
instead of concluding that subject matter prohibitions on religion are per se
unconstitutional based on Good News Club, the court could have more closely
scrutinized Good News Club to realize that the Supreme Court issued a more limited
holding.108 Lastly, the court could have further compared and contrasted COLTS’s
policy to nonpublic forum precedent to help establish the unreasonableness of the
policy.109
1.

Viewpoint Discrimination of COLTS’s Policy

In determining whether COLTS’s policy constituted viewpoint discrimination,
the dissent identified the subject to which Freethought desired to speak as
“religion—the existence or non-existence of a deity.”110 On the other hand, the
majority considered the subject to be “organizational existence, identity, and
outreach.”111
Ultimately, both the majority and the dissent correctly identified subjects that
Freethought’s advertisement addressed. The advertisement’s header of “Atheists”
would surely alert readers to Freethought’s organizational existence, identity, and
outreach while also conveying Freethought’s viewpoint on religion, i.e. the nonexistence of a deity.112 Nonetheless, organizational existence is a permissible subject
under COLTS’s policy, and the Supreme Court’s holding in Good News Club makes

104. See id. at 443 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (quoting WMATA, 897 F.3d at 329) (asserting that
Good News Club had no holding on the constitutionality of prohibiting religious activities that do
not primarily speak to a permissible subject).
105. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001) (noting that
viewpoint discrimination alone makes government policies unconstitutional).
106. For a further discussion of the public policy considerations regarding the Third Circuit’s
ruling, see infra Section V.B.
107. For a complete argument on the Third Circuit’s holding on COLTS’s viewpoint
discrimination, see infra Section V.A.1.
108. For a complete argument on the Third Circuit’s holding on the constitutionality of
subject matter prohibitions on religion, see infra Section V.A.2.
109. For a complete argument on the Third Circuit’s holding on the unreasonableness of
COLTS’s policy, see infra Section V.A.3.
110. Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. COLTS, 938 F.3d 424, 450 (3d Cir. 2019) (Cowen, J.,
dissenting) (describing the subject to which Freethought aimed to advertise).
111. Id. at 435 (majority opinion) (same).
112. See Freethought, 938 F.3d at 435 (reasoning that Freethought’s advertisement spoke to
its organizational existence while also touching on religion).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2022

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 6 [2022], Art. 6

2021]

AN EASY SELL

127

it clear that the government cannot prohibit a viewpoint on a permissible subject
simply because the viewpoint also communicates a religious message. 113 Therefore,
COLTS’s rejection of Freethought’s advertisement was unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination because the advertisement spoke to the permissible subject of
organizational existence while also communicating a religious message.114
2.

Prohibiting Religion as a Subject Matter

In Good News Club, the Supreme Court’s holding was more limited than finding
that all subject matter prohibitions on religion are unconstitutional. 115 The Court
recognized that the religious organization’s “‘quintessentially religious’ activities”
expressed a viewpoint on youth development, a permissible subject.116 Because
these activities expressed a viewpoint on a permissible subject, the Court reasoned
that the government could not prohibit these activities even if they also
communicated a religious message.117
The Freethought dissent recognized this and asserted that Good News Club did not
touch on the constitutionality of prohibiting religious activities when the activities
do not “primarily” speak to a permissible subject.118 This leaves open the possibility
that the government can enforce a prohibition on religion when religious activities
are not employed to primarily speak to a permissible subject.119 However, the
Supreme Court did not determine that the religious organization’s activities in Good
News Club primarily spoke to youth development. 120 Rather, the religious
organization’s quintessentially religious activities “recognizably” spoke to youth
development, allowing the Supreme Court to recognize that the organization was
expressing a viewpoint on a permissible subject.121 Therefore, Good News Club is
113. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 n.4 (2001) (reasoning that
it made no difference if the religious organization’s methodology communicated a religious message
because the methodology still expressed a viewpoint on a permissible subject).
114. See Freethought, 938 F.3d at 435 (holding that COLTS’s policy constituted viewpoint
discrimination).
115. See id. at 443 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (arguing that some subject matter prohibitions on
religion may be constitutional following Good News Club).
116. See id. at 433 (majority opinion) (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 103, 111)
(describing the holding in Good News Club).
117. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112 n.4 (“[W]e see no reason to treat the [religious
organization’s] use of religion as something other than a viewpoint merely because of any
evangelical message it conveys.”).
118. See Freethought, 938 F.3d at 443 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (quoting Archdiocese of Wash.
v. WMATA, 897 F.3d 314, 329 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1198 (2020)) (asserting that
Good News Club focused on the constitutionality of prohibiting religious activities that primarily
speak to a permissible subject).
119. See id. at 444 (arguing that the majority should have construed the holding in Good News
Club more narrowly).
120. See id. at 437 (majority opinion) (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111) (disagreeing
with the D.C. Circuit that speech must primarily relate to a permissible subject following Good News
Club); see generally Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107–13 (holding that the religious organization spoke
to a permissible subject but not stipulating that its speech primarily spoke to a permissible subject).
121. See Freethought, 938 F.3d at 437 (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111) (recognizing
that the speech in Good News Club was “quintessentially religious” but still spoke to the forum’s
permissible subject of youth development); WMATA, 897 F.3d at 329 (asserting that speech must
“primarily or recognizably” relate to a permissible subject to be protected as a viewpoint).
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limited to holding that the government can enforce a prohibition on religion as a
subject matter as long as religious activities are not employed to recognizably speak
to the forum’s permissible subjects.
3.

Unreasonableness of COLTS’s Policy

If in fact COLTS’s policy did not constitute viewpoint discrimination, the
policy would still need to be reasonable for it to be constitutional. 122 The Third
Circuit could have strengthened its holding on the unreasonableness of the policy
by considering the practical, peace driven, and financial considerations in nonpublic
forum precedent. From a practical perspective, nonpublic forum precedent lends
no support to the reasonableness of COLTS’s policy. Unlike the speech restriction
in Krishna Consciousness which addressed a significant, physical problem for the
forum’s efficiency, COLTS’s policy was not meant to alleviate any existing physical
problem on its buses.123 Moreover, unlike the speech restriction in Forbes that limited
the number of candidates in a debate, COLTS did not implement its policy because
it had too many advertising requests.124
Nonpublic forum case law also demonstrates the unreasonableness of
COLTS’s effort to maintain peace on its buses.125 Cohen, Perry, and Cornelius illustrate
that the government can restrict speech when it is reasonable to expect speech will
cause general hostility that inhibits the forum from functioning. 126 Unlike the history
of hostility that preceded the policies in Perry and Cornelius, there was a lack of
violence, complaints, or other hostility that resulted from COLTS’s advertisements
before its policy took effect. 127 Rather, COLTS’s policy is similar to the
unconstitutional restriction on speech in Cohen that silenced viewpoints out of an
unsubstantiated fear of disturbance.128 COLTS pointed to threats and boycotts that
were encountered by five out-of-state businesses, but COLTS offered no basis as to
why it too would encounter these isolated reactions or disturbances.129 Therefore,

122. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
(citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)) (detailing the
constitutionality of subject matter prohibitions).
123. See Freethought, 938 F.3d at 440 (first citing Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 689 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring); and then citing Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 n.5 (1975)) (noting that COLTS’s advertisements were not physically
intrusive).
124. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669–673, 683 (1998)
(recognizing that the speech restriction was necessary to preserve the forum).
125. For a discussion of COLTS’s effort to maintain peace in the forum, see infra notes
126–30 and accompanying text.
126. For a discussion of the holdings in Cohen, Perry, and Cornelius, see supra notes 49–56 and
accompanying text.
127. See Freethought, 938 F.3d at 429, 439 (noting there was no history of conflict on COLTS’s
buses despite a history of running religious advertisements).
128. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22–23 (1971) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)) (holding that an unsubstantiated “fear or
apprehension of disturbance” is not a reasonable basis to restrict speech).
129. See Freethought, 938 F.3d at 429–30 (noting that COLTS restricted speech after learning
of the disturbances that other businesses encountered).
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COLTS’s unsubstantiated fear of disturbance was insufficient reasoning for it to
restrict speech.130
The financial considerations from nonpublic forum case law demonstrate
additional unreasonableness in COLTS’s policy. 131 In Cornelius, the government’s
restriction on lobbyist speech was reasonable because donations represented the
entirety of the drive’s revenue, and donations decreased when the restriction on
lobbyists was lifted in a prior year drive.132 In Freethought, COLTS restricted speech
without citing a history of declining bus fares or advertising revenues, and these
revenue sources only represented a minute portion of COLTS’s funding. 133 Based
on these financial considerations and the practical and peace driven considerations
discussed earlier, COLTS’s policy was far from “the most reasonable or the only
reasonable limitation” on speech for the forum. 134 Instead, the policy wasn’t
reasonable at all.135
B. Public Policy Considerations
Public policy considerations offer further praise for the Third Circuit’s ruling. 136
COLTS’s policy of trading freedom of speech for security poses dangers for our
society.137 One commentator has noted that trading freedom for security today leads
to a loss of both freedom and security tomorrow. 138 For example, the Weimar
Republic enacted legislation that allowed the government to restrict the freedom of
speech during turbulent times in the name of protecting the citizenry, but the Nazis
used this law to eliminate opposition, consolidate power, and deprive many people
of both liberty and security.139 Additional scholars have noted that when the
government restricts civil liberties during a time of turmoil, it is often difficult for
citizens to have the restrictions repealed and to regain their freedoms once the

130. See id. at 439–40 (recognizing that there were no prior disturbances on COLTS’s buses
that a speech restriction could help to stop).
131. For a discussion of the financial considerations of COLTS’s policy, see infra notes 132–
34 and accompanying text.
132. See 473 U.S. 788, 808, 810 (1985) (noting that restrictions on speech reasonably
prevented a decrease in the forum’s revenue).
133. See 938 F.3d at 428 (noting that bus fares were “negligible” and that advertising revenue
was less than two percent of COLTS’s revenue).
134. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808 (explaining the constitutionality of speech prohibitions in
nonpublic forums).
135. See Freethought, 938 F.3d at 442 (finding that COLTS’s policy was unreasonable).
136. For a discussion of the additional policy considerations, see infra notes 137–45 and
accompanying text.
137. For a further discussion of the dangers COLTS’s policy offers, see infra notes 138–41
and accompanying text.
138. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid and Ben Zion Lahav, Public Interest vs. Private Lives—Affording
Public Figures Privacy in the Digital Era: The Three Principle Filtering Model, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 975,
975 (2017) (asserting that trading liberty for security yields a loss of both over time).
139. See Reichstagsbrandverordnung [Reichstag Fire Decree], Feb. 28, 1933, RBBl I at 83
(Ger.), translated in Reichstag Fire Decree, UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM,
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/reichstag-fire-decree
[https://perma.cc/PX9B-42UK] (last visited Jan. 30, 2021) (detailing Nazi efforts to undermine
civil liberties shortly after gaining power).
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turmoil subsides.140 By refusing to enforce COLTS’s policy, the Third Circuit helped
to ensure that the long-term loss of liberty in the name of security does not
materialize.141
Another good policy implication of the Third Circuit’s ruling is that it refrains
from rewarding intolerant behavior from the public.142 The Third Circuit recognized
that silencing the freedom of speech out of concern for boycotts or violence offers
an incentive for citizens to engage in these activities.143 When the government
silences speech because people find it offensive, the aim of the First Amendment is
not upheld: “protect[ing] unpopular individuals from retaliation—and their ideas
from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.”144 The Third Circuit
recognized this and upheld the aim of the First Amendment in its ruling.145
VI.

COLLECTING MARKET FEEDBACK: FREETHOUGHT’S IMPACT

The Third Circuit’s ruling will have many practical and legal effects, but the
practical effects will be more immediate.146 Other Third Circuit government entities
will need to review their speech policies to ensure these policies are not viewpoint
discriminatory, illustrated by AmTran’s recent review of its policy.147 In addition,
these entities will need to modify their policies to allow for speech on religion as a
subject matter.148 COLTS has already modified its policy in the wake of Freethought,
removing restrictions on religious advertisements.149

140. See, e.g., Kevin J. Barry, Liberty Under Attack: Reclaiming Our Freedoms in an Age of Terror,
54-SEP FED. LAW. 53, 54 (2007) (asserting that society does not always regain its liberties with ease
once taken away, even when the underlying reasons for the deprivation ameliorate).
141. For a further discussion of the threat to liberty, see supra notes 137–40 and
accompanying text.
142. For a further discussion of incentivizing intolerant behavior, see infra notes 143–45 and
accompanying text.
143. See Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. COLTS, 938 F.3d 424, 438 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing
Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty., 781 F.3d 489, 504 (9th Cir. 2015) (Christen, J.,
dissenting)) (“It invites a heckler’s veto by signaling that the government will suppress unpopular
speech if the public behaves badly.”).
144. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (describing
constitutional freedoms); Freethought, 938 F.3d at 438 (arguing that COLTS’s policy did not uphold
the purpose of the freedom of speech).
145. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s ruling, see supra Section IV.
146. See William Kibler, Court Ruling Has Amtran Suspending Ad Program, ALTOONA MIRROR
(Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.altoonamirror.com/news/local-news/2019/11/court-ruling-hasamtran-suspending-ad-program/ [https://perma.cc/RBD4-SYX8] (recognizing that Altoona
Metro Transit (“AmTran”) began reconsidering its advertising policy within two months of the
Freethought ruling).
147. See id. (recognizing AmTran’s reasoning for reconsidering its policy).
148. See Freethought, 938 F.3d at 433 (quoting Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
U.S. 98, 103, 111 (2001)) (holding that government entities cannot prohibit speech on religion).
149. See Policy Governing All Advertising in or upon County of Lackawanna Transit System Facilities
and Vehicles, CTY. OF LACKAWANNA TRANSIT SYS. AUTH., https://coltsbus.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/03/Advertising-Policy-Amended-11.18.2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4MF-N8F3] (last updated Nov. 18, 2020) (detailing COLTS’s advertising
policy adopted in November, 2020).
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Concerning the legal effects of the Third Circuit’s ruling, COLTS has
announced it will not appeal the case to the Supreme Court.150 In addition, the Third
Circuit appears poised to continue its broad reading of First Amendment rights, as
seen in the Third Circuit’s 2020 ruling in Center for Investigative Reporting v. Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority. 151 In this case, the Third Circuit held that
SEPTA’s prohibition on political advertisements was unconstitutional because the
policy was ambiguous as to what qualified as political speech under the policy. 152
Freethought’s impact demonstrates that the freedom of speech will continue to
endure in strength throughout the Third Circuit.153 This endurance isn’t just for
atheists or other religious people, but for all Americans who esteem the freedom of
speech.154 Fortunately, the Third Circuit recognizes that maintaining the freedom
of speech means ruling in favor of tolerance. 155

150. See Terrie Morgan-Besecker, COLTS Won’t Appeal Religious Ads Ruling, SCRANTON
TIMES-TRIB.,
https://www.thetimes-tribune.com/news/colts-wont-appeal-religious-adsruling/article_c526feb7-a3d1-5216-93c2-7c977a9ff2b5.amp.html (last updated June 9, 2020)
(noting COLTS is not appealing the ruling).
151. See 975 F.3d 300, 303–04 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority’s (“SEPTA”) speech prohibition unconstitutional).
152. See id. at 316–17 (comparing SEPTA’s policy to the statute at issue in Minnesota Voters
Alliance v. Manksy, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018)).
153. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s broad reading of the First Amendment, see supra
notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of American esteem for free speech, see supra note 2 and
accompanying text.
155. See Wintonick, supra note 1, at 184 (asserting that the freedom of speech requires
tolerance for disagreeable views).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss6/6

16

